- Asked by: Rhoda Grant, MSP for Highlands and Islands, Scottish Labour
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Date lodged: Monday, 02 December 2013
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Current Status:
Answered by Alex Neil on 12 December 2013
To ask the Scottish Government whether, prior to the IT failure on 1 October 2013, NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde had checked whether it could restore its active directory service from backups and what the reasons are for its position on this matter.
Answer
A full Active Directory recovery was not performed due to not having an environment where this could be done safely. This is now being re-assessed. However, the backups have been used previously to perform granular recovery of Active Directory objects in the live active directory.
- Asked by: Rhoda Grant, MSP for Highlands and Islands, Scottish Labour
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Date lodged: Monday, 02 December 2013
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Current Status:
Answered by Alex Neil on 12 December 2013
To ask the Scottish Government on what basis the report, Technical Assurance Review: NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde: Critical Incident - 1 October 2013, concluded that "the design and implementation of the XGGC Microsoft Active Directory with associated services is a fit for purpose and resilient implementation" given that it found that the error was "associated with the Active Directory software environment". Â
Answer
A system can be designed and implemented in a manner deemed fit for purpose and resilient, and yet still suffer from an unforeseen incident.
- Asked by: Rhoda Grant, MSP for Highlands and Islands, Scottish Labour
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Date lodged: Monday, 02 December 2013
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Current Status:
Answered by Alex Neil on 12 December 2013
To ask the Scottish Government, in relation to the IT failure at NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde on 1 October 2013, whether active directory auditing was switched off and, if so, for what reason.
Answer
Reduced auditing was in place due to the impact that such services have on systems performance. We are however reviewing this in light of the recent incident and will introduce appropriate and proportionate auditing in due course.
- Asked by: Rhoda Grant, MSP for Highlands and Islands, Scottish Labour
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Date lodged: Monday, 02 December 2013
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Current Status:
Answered by Alex Neil on 12 December 2013
To ask the Scottish Government how many rapid alerts were caused by the IT failure at NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde of 1 October 2013.
Answer
Maternity and emergency services were maintained throughout the period disrupted by the IT incident.
- Asked by: Rhoda Grant, MSP for Highlands and Islands, Scottish Labour
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Date lodged: Monday, 02 December 2013
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Current Status:
Answered by Alex Neil on 12 December 2013
To ask the Scottish Government what its position is on NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde becoming "paper-light" over the next 12 months in light of the IT failure of 1 October 2013 and what guidance the Scottish Government will give to clinicians on treating patients when no patient information is available.
Answer
The position of Scottish Government and NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde remains unchanged. The eHealth Strategy makes clear the commitment for all health boards to become ‘paper-light’ in a controlled and incremental fashion because of the considerable benefits that this brings (including better service continuity and information availability compared to paper). Paper workarounds do have their place in certain circumstances, but increasingly health boards are deploying more resilient ICT which means that information can still be available from alternative digital sources. Each board has business continuity plans, and associated guidance in this area.
- Asked by: Rhoda Grant, MSP for Highlands and Islands, Scottish Labour
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Date lodged: Monday, 02 December 2013
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Current Status:
Answered by Alex Neil on 12 December 2013
To ask the Scottish Government whether all the information actualisation/processing caused by the IT failure at NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde of 1 October 2013 has been completed.
Answer
Information processing has been completed. All national returns have been provided and all patient transactions processed. No business or patient data was lost.
- Asked by: Rhoda Grant, MSP for Highlands and Islands, Scottish Labour
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Date lodged: Monday, 02 December 2013
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Current Status:
Answered by Alex Neil on 12 December 2013
To ask the Scottish Government whether NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde will publish its information security management system documentation.
Answer
NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde regards its IT Information Systems as critical health infrastructure. Accordingly it would not be appropriate to put detailed systems documentation (especially Information Security) into the public domain.
- Asked by: Rhoda Grant, MSP for Highlands and Islands, Scottish Labour
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Date lodged: Monday, 02 December 2013
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Current Status:
Answered by Alex Neil on 12 December 2013
To ask the Scottish Government, in relation to the IT failure at NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde on 1 October 2013, whether the built-in Windows back-up service was in use at the time of the incident.
Answer
Native Windows Server Backup was not being used prior to the incident. Symantec Backup Exec was used to backup the domain controllers. It was Symantec Backup Exec which was used to recover Active Directory.
- Asked by: Rhoda Grant, MSP for Highlands and Islands, Scottish Labour
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Date lodged: Monday, 02 December 2013
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Current Status:
Answered by Alex Neil on 12 December 2013
To ask the Scottish Government whether NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde has a disaster recovery site to switch to in the event of a failure of its main site and what the reasons are for its position on this matter.
Answer
NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde runs dual active data centres, separated by 14 km and the River Clyde. These are linked by multiple super-high speed data connections, making the concept of a passive disaster recovery site redundant. This design is accepted best practice for modern data centres.
- Asked by: Rhoda Grant, MSP for Highlands and Islands, Scottish Labour
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Date lodged: Tuesday, 03 December 2013
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Current Status:
Answered by Michael Matheson on 11 December 2013
To ask the Scottish Government whether the implementation plans produced by NHS boards for Neonatal Care in Scotland: a Quality Framework will be made public and, if so, in what form.
Answer
The new Local Delivery Plan format, focusing on the 12 priority areas for action in the Routemap to the 2020 Vision for Health and Social Care, will give NHS boards the opportunity to set out the action they are taking to implement Neonatal Care in Scotland: A Quality Framework.
Considerable progress has already been made, with the vast majority of statements in Neonatal Care in Scotland: A Quality Framework already being met, and full implementation taking place over the next five to 10 years.