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My next point is not unrelated to the point that you have made about maintenance. The capital depreciation figure in your accounts seems to have gone up significantly in recent years. Obviously, the increase will not be even, year on year, given the nature of capital budgets, full stop, as well as the factors that are involved in depreciation in particular. However, the figure seems to have risen significantly. In three years, it goes from £60 million to £117 million—that is the projection for the year after next—so it is nearly doubling. Do you have any detail on why the depreciation figure appears to be rising consistently and quite rapidly?

Minister, you will be aware that the trade union representatives who have appeared before us suggested that the bill gives us an opportunity to increase transparency and perhaps set some stronger rules around senior staff salaries at institutions. As you know, I have a lot of sympathy with that position. In particular, I cannot understand why college principals are exempt from the salary rules that apply to every other chief executive equivalent in the public sector. I am interested in your response to what the unions have put forward in that regard, particularly Mary Senior’s point that the current position makes it harder to argue for public money to go to those institutions when there are many more than 100 members of senior staff at universities in particular who earn far in excess of what the First Minister does—sometimes four times as much.

Up to a point, I understand what you are saying. The reality is that, conditions can be attached to the significant amounts of public funding that an institution receives. I understand the distinction between universities and colleges: universities are independent institutions that compete in a more globalised market. I do not accept that that makes the University of Edinburgh principal’s recent salary increase acceptable.

We have discussed this before, but is it still the Government’s position that college principals should not be subject to the chief executive pay framework that applies to all other equivalent roles across the public sector, other than public-owned companies such as Scottish Water and Scottish Rail Holdings?

Yes.

That is helpful. I have some sympathy with the Universities Scotland position on this. It was also looking for a bit more clarity with regard to the point that Andrew just made about what should be in the bill. There should be something clear there. It should not be too specific—the point of using regulations is that they are more flexible—but there should be something in the bill to give a sufficient degree of clarity over what kind of threshold we are setting.

I know that last week’s Official Report has not been published yet.

Drafting instructions have already been requested on the matter.

I appreciate that. To make broaden out my point—this overlaps somewhat with John Mason’s line of questioning about powers of compulsion in relation to information provision and the Dundee example—two quite different points of view have been put to us, not only in this evidence session but during the past couple of years.

The Educational Institute of Scotland has articulated the issue most clearly. It believes that the SFC has simply not exercised the powers that are already available to it to address poor governance and decision making in relation to not just financial viability but other matters, such as the erosion of fair work principles in particular, at institutions. The alternative position that the previous SFC chief executive articulated—I think that she said this when she last gave evidence to us before leaving the post—was that the SFC had insufficient powers of compulsion in relation to institutions.

The question that I have put to a lot of the witnesses whom we spoken to so far has been about clawback. The SFC can claw back public money that has been provided to anyone that it funds. It is an incredibly blunt tool, and in many situations it would actually make things worse, particularly financial crises. As a result of the bill, would the SFC have sufficient powers to be able to exercise appropriate influence, and do you accept the point that clawback, although perhaps sometimes an effective stick to wield, will not be an effective means of enforcement or compulsion—however you want to word it—nine times out of 10?

Do you accept the point that there needs to be something short of that? It is—quite appropriately—often not used, because it would make the situation worse. However, the SFC needs to have other tools at its disposal.

I have one final point to make for clarity, which is one that Universities Scotland raised in its evidence on the threshold for information sharing—this goes back to John Mason's line of questioning. Universities Scotland pointed out that there is a bit of inconsistency—there certainly is in the explanatory notes—on the general principle of when information should be shared, which seems to have been set at quite a high threshold. Sir Paul Grice of Universities Scotland felt that the examples seem to be at a lower threshold than the principle that had been set out.

Universities Scotland was seeking a bit of clarity. It would like an initial statement of clarity from the Government, but also for greater clarity to be put into the bill or an assurance about the level of clarity that will be put into the relevant regulations if such clarity is not put into the bill.