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One of the problems with the provisions in section 2 relating to “public safety” and

“prejudice to the interests of justice”

is that the lack of definition means that they can be interpreted differently. In speaking to my amendments, I suggested that the bill will lead to a narrowing of the rule on when remand can be used, which will mean that fewer people will be held on remand.

However, is it possible that the obverse could be the case—that, because “public safety” is not defined, the interpretation of

“the interests of public safety”

could be so wide that more people could be remanded, which is entirely counter to the Government’s ambitions?

I will respond to that intervention before bringing in Pauline McNeill, if she still wishes to intervene.

I agree with everything that you just said. I think that there is an enhanced role for electronic monitoring, especially given that, if the bill passes—as it inevitably will—people out there will be looking for the quid pro quo. Part of that might be about the Government utilising lots of different tools at its disposal and equipping our courts with as much as possible to improve outcomes for victims and those who are nervous about offenders. There is a conversation to be had about that, but that is not what the section in question does. It has to be removed, not fixed, because of its primary purpose: it is all about the time spent on electronic monitoring in proportion to the final sentence. It even goes so far as dictating what that should be.

I agree—I would like to see some Government amendments at the next stage that address how electronic monitoring can be better used in remand and bail decisions. However, none of that will fit anywhere from the bottom of page 3 to the top half of page 5 of the bill; the only way is to remove the section and put something else in. I say to Ms Stevenson that the section cannot be changed to do what she wants it to do in any meaningful way. For that very reason, I suggest that we take out the section, because it is about an entirely different matter. It is not about the enhanced use of electronic monitoring.

I should have indicated earlier that I wanted to speak on this group.

I know that members have to make decisions, so it may be helpful for them to know that Conservatives would support all the amendments in the group that have been discussed so far, if they are moved, with the exception of amendments 28 and 29, which Katy Clark has indicated that she may not move. We were keen to understand the cause and the possible effects of those amendments, but that has been made clear through Ms Clark’s comments.

I would also have supported Colette Stevenson’s amendment 52. I tried to submit a similarly worded amendment, but the legislation team explained that a similar amendment had already been lodged, which meant that I was unable to do so. For that reason, as members can see in their papers, I added my support to amendment 52.

Ms Stevenson has reflected on amendment 52 and indicated that she will not move it. I wanted to submit a similar amendment, because the issue is relevant and pertinent. I am sure that the cabinet secretary will have some comments to make about the issue, which is about considering the safety of victims in decisions about bail. The amendment would provide for information that is

“submitted by or obtained from”

victims to be included during the consideration of bail, with specific regard to any vulnerabilities particular to that victim.

Decisions on the bill will, of course, affect not only the offender—the accused, I should say—but the complainer, as Collette Stevenson’s amendment 52 recognises. That is why I welcomed the amendment. For that reason, I will move the amendment when the time comes.

I thank my colleague for his comments. Amendment 35, in Katy Clark’s name, is well drafted and important. There is a suggestion that it would increase the workload of the courts, and we are all a bit nervous about that. These are fast-moving hearings. However, there is a gap here, because victims are left in the dark as to why certain decisions are made. If we are going to make changes, which the bill does—whatever our views are on those changes—let us make changes that improve the information that is given to victims.

If bail is granted, it is entirely reasonable and rational for the appropriate reasons to be given. The court should set out the specifics of why it believes that the accused does not pose a risk to public safety—that is the new test, and it includes the safety of the complainer, which is important—and why it thinks, if relevant, that the accused can be appropriately managed through the imposition of bail conditions. We are looking at a scenario in which the courts say, “We have a new enhanced bail test but, on balance, we believe that the risk can be managed through, for example, enhanced bail conditions, and here are the reasons why we do not believe that this individual poses an immediate risk to the complainer and can therefore be released back into the community.”

At the moment, the only recourse available would be for the complainer to make representations to the Crown and ask for an appeal. There is no mechanism for the complainer to request that a reason be given for a decision, other than what has been said verbally in the court on the day, and to hear that, you would have to be there, which, for many complainers, would not be entirely appropriate. We all know the problems with getting records and transcripts of what has been said in court—it is a prolonged and expensive process.

Unless the Crown has been proactive in providing information to the complainer about why it thinks bail was granted, there is no real mechanism for getting that information. I do not want to add to the workload of the court clerks or to make the decision-making process more difficult for judges and sheriffs. However, if we are going to enhance the process by which reasons must be given for remanding someone, we should do the same for the contrary situation—we must give complainants more and better information when bail is granted. Accepting amendment 35 is one way of doing that, and things could be tidied up by the Government ahead of stage 3.

Equally, it would be a good outcome if the cabinet secretary said that she will take the matter away and work with members to see what can be done, but we need that commitment. Otherwise, if Katy Clark does not push this issue, someone else will.

We have been trying to decipher the effect that amendment 33 might have. Is its purpose that the court must take into account not only the diet that is relevant to the specific remand hearing but any and all outstanding hearings? For example, if an accused was in front of a remand court but was also the subject of a number of other live cases that were going through the system, and, if the accused had a history of absconding in relation to those cases, would that be taken into account in relation to the other case? It sounds as though quite a lot of work would be involved. Who would present or deliver that information to the judge or the Crown?

I am sympathetic to the idea, because one of the problems with the bill—I will come on to this in talking about my amendments in the group—is that it might remove the safeguard of being able to use remand for repeat absconders. However, will Katy Clark clarify the effect that amendment 33 would have?

I thank Pauline McNeill for lodging amendment 65. As she said, the amendment was one of a number of proposals from victims organisations, and I think that the rationale has been quite well explained. Those organisations have some nervousness about the matter.

When we took evidence on the proposal, there were two schools of thought, which were expressed publicly and in private. It seems that the legal profession is keen to see the removal of section 23D of the 1995 act, which it feels is problematic. I wonder whether the Government had discussions with the Crown, solicitors and the judiciary on the issue, as such discussions might underlie the rationale for removing section 23D. Equally, the perception of a number of organisations was that its potential removal is worrying—they feel that section 23D is a valid safety net, particularly for those who are at risk of domestic abuse and sexual crime.

Victim Support Scotland got in touch with a number of members, seeking to remove section 3, which will abolish section 23D. It is important that I put that organisation’s claims on the record because I would like the cabinet secretary to address them. Victim Support Scotland’s perception might be an error, but I want to give the cabinet secretary at least the opportunity to alleviate its concerns. Its interpretation is that the proposal to remove section 23D would

“allow bail to be granted to convicted repeat and serial perpetrators of domestic abuse and sexual offending against women and who present a particular danger to women’s safety.”

It went on:

“Given women’s experiences of abusers being given bail, including the lived experience of survivors given in evidence to the Criminal Justice Committee, women need as much protection as the law can afford them. The safety of victims should be at the heart of any decision to release a person on bail, so the removal of this restriction and reliance on the new all-encompassing bail test does little to show victims of these types of crime that their safety is being protected under the law”.

Those are Victim Support Scotland’s words, not mine. I do not want to put words into anyone’s mouth or even take a personal view on the issue, but there is a case to be answered around the removal of section 23D, and amendment 65 gives us the opportunity to have that debate.

I support it, so I will move it.

Amendment 52 moved—[Jamie Greene.]

It is quite a strong deterrent for a person—knowing that they might end up in a prison cell.

Is it the plan that, using intelligence, the police will stop and search prior to entry to the stadium? If fireworks, pyrotechnics, flares or other devices are found on persons, will they be denied entry and the items removed, or will the items be removed but the persons still be allowed entry to the football game? I ask in order to be clear.

Would they actually be charged at that time?