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It would probably be helpful to do that. Before I start talking about this, I presume that it is all in the public domain. I am looking at page 13 of the correspondence from the chief financial officer, rather than at your report, but it is relevant. If you do not have that, we can look at it some other time.

I imagine that the same will be true when we have the conversation about 2023-24. What are you looking for when you see huge underspend figures in the final outturn?

That is diplomatic.

The point that I am making is that we hear evidence of projects being put on hold, reprofiled or moved into future years to make ends meet, as is required of Government, and we hear about moratoriums on new capital investment. It is right for the public to ask us why schools or ferries are not being built and why hospitals are not being replaced when we are producing bits of paper that show £0.5 billion of underspend in the final outturn. I appreciate that the answer probably lies in complex accounting, but that straightforward question is asked of Parliament, which is why I raise it.

While we are on the issue of commercial assets, I might well jump ahead to the issue of Ferguson Marine and the assets in that respect. Your report specifically picks out MV Glen Rosa and MV Glen Sannox. The estimate for completing the vessels still sits at around £300 million. I think that that is your understanding, too, but in your report you make some criticism of the due diligence process with regard to value for money. Can you talk us through your concerns?

Auditor General, you will be aware that the vessels were supposed to cost under £100 million—that is, for both. The latest figure, back in March, was £300 million. My suspicion is that it might have gone up since then, given the further problems that have been encountered at the yard. You do not state that that does not sound like value for money, but you allude to it. Is that your assessment?

From a public expenditure point of view, if that £100 million becomes £350 million or £400 million, is there not a risk that costs will endlessly spiral? Is there a mechanism for intervening and saying, “Look—you can’t just keep chucking money at something endlessly”? Those figures seem to show massive jumps, not little increments of overspend, so when you look at budget versus what is actually being spent—when things are going massively over budget, by hundreds of millions of pounds, in a very short space of time—what is the cut-off?

I look forward to that.

At this point, I have to ask you to help me to understand what is reasonably complex auditing language, and to put it in layman’s terms for politicians and the wider public who, perhaps, are not qualified in that regard. I am looking at exhibit 2, which is about the specific strategic commercial assets—that is, Glasgow Prestwick Airport Ltd, Ferguson Marine (Port Glasgow) Ltd and, of course, the Liberty Steel smelter and Burntisland Fabrications Ltd. I wonder whether you can help me to understand what you are reporting there, given the strong interest that this committee and others have shown in the matter for a number of years.

Each of the entities will have a perceived value, as the Government has stated that there is an intention to return them to private ownership in the future. Alongside that, though, there is the issue of the money that has already been invested by the public purse in those businesses, normally by way of loans, some of which appear on the balance sheet in the consolidated accounts. Can you talk us through what you are seeing at the moment? What is the bigger picture with those assets? Shall we start with Prestwick?

To put it in simple terms, what rationale would the Government present for the increase in the numbers? The value of Prestwick has doubled whereas, for Ferguson Marine—albeit that it is a small percentage of the money that has been invested—the £304 million that has been invested now sits at a value of £94 million, which is less than a third. What factors are you seeing that give you comfort that those are true and accurate assumptions?

This is reminding me of “The Antiques Roadshow”, because things are only worth what someone is willing to pay for them. How do you marry that with the value of the loans in the consolidated accounts? At what point would you, as auditor general, say that the Government is not being realistic about the opportunity to recover its investments? It could very well just say up front, “Look, we’re going to write these assets off, because we don’t expect any future owner of the assets to give us any of the money back.” Is there some pretence that it might get some of the money back, and this is just a risk assessment of how much it might recover? It just sounds like a very subjective approach to what has been invested and how much might be lost.

I see from your report that, as of the end of March this year, the total outstanding capital borrowing was £1.76 billion, and the amount that was borrowed for capital projects was less than the cap. Therefore, there is still a bit of wriggle room, so if the Government wanted to borrow more money for capital projects, more money would be available.

That is helpful feedback. You mentioned the concept of borrowing. We are frequently told that the Scottish Government has no ability to borrow money, but can you talk us through the national loans fund and how that is used? The presumption is that the Government cannot get itself into debt per se. However, it has an ability to borrow when that is required. Where does that money come from and what can it be spent on?