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Exhibit 4, which shows the barriers to accessing support, sums up the issues. It covers alcohol and drugs, but it talks us through the user journey very nicely, from the point of someone seeking help as an individual through to their getting help and then staying on the path to recovery. The list of barriers is unbelievable. There are so many barriers to people getting from the point where they identify that they have a problem to coming out the other side and being supported and in a better place in life.

I find the barriers that you have identified and the way that you have presented them to be quite extreme and quite shocking, to be honest. Perhaps that identifies the problem, because some people will engage with one or two of those issues on their journey, and others will face them all. Is that part of the problem? Perhaps that is the answer to my first question about why Scotland has such a big issue.

This is an important and difficult subject. Many of us will have lots of lived experience of this subject matter—I certainly do—so I am very keen that we try to get to the bottom of things. I have read your report, which is excellent. Unfortunately, it repeats much of what has been said in the past. I want to dig into that.

We all know the top-line statistics: we know that Scotland’s drug death rate is three times higher than that of England and double that of Wales, and that, arguably, it is the highest in Europe. We also know that spending on drug and alcohol services has increased, more or less, over the past decade, although it has flatlined a little over the past year or two. The Government acknowledged that there was an issue and started to pump cash into addressing it. It created the specific role of a drugs minister and it established a national mission—the media attention and the world’s focus on the issue pushed the Government to do so. The drug deaths situation is described as our national shame, and rightly so.

I do not understand—and I still cannot answer this question—why the drug and alcohol death rates in Scotland are so high relative to those of our neighbours. I simply cannot get my head around that. The report identifies many areas where improvement is needed, but I do not think that it answers that question.

Okay. This is an observation, more than anything—I am not necessarily criticising the presence of the division—but 40 people is a lot of folk. Really, there are only two strategic commercial assets that are wholly owned by the public, and another two that have had public financial intervention. Therefore, it is not a huge portfolio to manage—if that makes sense. We often hear that those are independent self-managing organisations with their own executive management teams, directorships and reporting mechanisms. The question, then, for a future date is whether this is just overkill or the division is doing its job effectively. I understand that the division is a response to your recommendations.

Here is the conundrum. If the accountable officer identifies that there will be a fairly substantial additional cost and that, in their view, the project does not represent value for money to the public, yet ministers decide, as is their prerogative, to put more money into that project, what is your role in that process? Clearly, a process is being followed, but it is not necessarily leading to a good outcome in terms of value for money. What are you looking to see from the Government should there be further cost overruns?

Good morning. I have a broad range of areas to cover. I will start by taking us back to something that Carole Grant said about outstanding accounts from 2022-23 that are still to be produced, published and made available. In correspondence from the chief financial officer just last week, we received a summary of the final outturn for 2022-23. I want to have a quick look at that, because it is relevant to this year’s consolidated accounts. Does that financial outturn take into account best guesstimates for those departments that are yet to report? Is it your understanding that there may be another version of the final outturn—a final final outturn, if you like?

It would probably be helpful to do that. Before I start talking about this, I presume that it is all in the public domain. I am looking at page 13 of the correspondence from the chief financial officer, rather than at your report, but it is relevant. If you do not have that, we can look at it some other time.

I imagine that the same will be true when we have the conversation about 2023-24. What are you looking for when you see huge underspend figures in the final outturn?

That is diplomatic.

The point that I am making is that we hear evidence of projects being put on hold, reprofiled or moved into future years to make ends meet, as is required of Government, and we hear about moratoriums on new capital investment. It is right for the public to ask us why schools or ferries are not being built and why hospitals are not being replaced when we are producing bits of paper that show £0.5 billion of underspend in the final outturn. I appreciate that the answer probably lies in complex accounting, but that straightforward question is asked of Parliament, which is why I raise it.

While we are on the issue of commercial assets, I might well jump ahead to the issue of Ferguson Marine and the assets in that respect. Your report specifically picks out MV Glen Rosa and MV Glen Sannox. The estimate for completing the vessels still sits at around £300 million. I think that that is your understanding, too, but in your report you make some criticism of the due diligence process with regard to value for money. Can you talk us through your concerns?

That is really helpful. Perhaps those are questions for Government departments to answer in the future.

I will move the conversation on to strategic commercial assets, on which your report helpfully provides some analysis. The strategic commercial assets division is a fairly new venture, in governance terms. My understanding is that it employs around 40 staff and spends a considerable amount of money on external consultants. I use the word “considerable”, which is subjective. It spent £1.6 million last year. Is there any indication of the cost of that operation to the Government? In your opinion, does it represent good value? It is a fairly new set-up.

I guess that that is the question. We know the total value of money invested from the public purse and we know what it was thought might be recoverable, or what the value of the loan was, which is not necessarily the value of the business itself. That would be a whole other conversation. That value seems to have jumped up massively. Are you confident that there is sufficient rationale for what is almost a doubling of the recoverable value of the loans?