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Amendment 50 relates to section 6, which will permanently increase the limit of the fixed penalties from £300 to £500. Sections 6(1)(b) and 6(1)(c) allow Scottish ministers to further increase that by regulations should they wish to do so. My amendment 50 seeks to simply delete that power, thus preventing ministers from straightforwardly increasing the fixed penalty amount to a higher level.

My reason for lodging the amendment is that I am concerned about the knock-on impact of a further increase to the fiscal fine level, which could mean that far more serious crimes are dealt with by fiscal fine. The increase to £500 can be entirely justified on inflationary grounds and we know that, at that level, it will cover offences such as shoplifting—which is, admittedly, causing huge problems for retailers, but that is another matter that we will need to address in another forum.

However, if ministers used the power in the bill to increase the maximum fine to, for the sake of argument, £1,000, it is not difficult to see how that would lead to more serious crimes being dealt with by fiscal fine. A £500 fine might not be considered sufficient punishment, so a matter would be dealt with in another way, but a fine of £1,000 might well be seen as a sufficient punishment. To me, that seems to bring problems.

The committee’s report illustrates some of those problems when it states:

“One final point made about the use of fiscal fines for offences such as shoplifting was that the public might perceive their use as diminishing the importance with which the justice system treats such offences.”

It goes on to say:

“Simon Brown of the Scottish Solicitors Bar Association commented: ‘At a practical level—this has been picked up in the press—we see the effective decriminalisation of shoplifting. Shoplifting becomes an offence that is viewed as a low-level crime and is dealt with by fiscal fines.’”

A related point is that the Scottish Conservatives obtained statistics that show that, between 2018 and 2021, more than one in three people who refused the offer of a fiscal fine had no further action taken against them—so, in effect, they faced no punishment for their crime. I can supply that data to the cabinet secretary afterwards, if she wishes. The more fines are issued and the higher they are, the more serious the crimes are that people are, in effect, getting off with.

For that reason, I move amendment 50.

In that case, does the cabinet secretary concede that, if the Scottish ministers set the level at £500 and decide that that is the appropriate level, it should simply go up with inflation, rather than be tied to any decision by ministers to include more crimes within the ambit of fiscal fines?

I understand the point that is being made but, as I said, Simon Brown of the Scottish Solicitors Bar Association told this committee:

“At a practical level … we see the effective decriminalisation of shoplifting. Shoplifting becomes an offence that is viewed as a low-level crime”.—[Official Report, Criminal Justice Committee, 22 January 2025; c 32.]

I understand the point that the cabinet secretary is making, but we have to consider how the offence is viewed, and that is the point that was made by that witness to this committee.

Finally, there is one more reason why I am not persuaded by the cabinet secretary’s arguments. She said clearly that she has no plans to increase the level of fiscal fines and that she has other things to deal with. Of course, I completely understand that. However, there is a reshuffle going on right now, as I understand it, and an election pending in less than 12 months. I would argue that, when the cabinet secretary said in her remarks that we need to future proof the legislation, she made my point for me.

For the reasons that I have outlined, I press amendment 50.

I have a question on that point, which relates to Rona Mackay’s comment. If the cabinet secretary is not persuaded that amendment 54 is for this bill, would she be receptive to Maggie Chapman lodging it at stage 3 of the Victims, Witnesses, and Justice Reform (Scotland) Bill?

The definition point is a good one and I propose to vote for it. I am looking back at our report and see that many witnesses expressed concern about widening the definition, so I understand why the amendments are being made. However, there were witnesses who said that they prefer the original definition as drafted and gave various reasons for that. What does the cabinet secretary say to them? Obviously, their view is not the preferred view.

What does the data show will be the impact of the reduction on rehabilitation? Arguably, if there is less time in prison, there is less time for prison rehabilitation to work and to prepare people for the outside. One would hope that the data is robust, but I ask the question because it could look like just another way to empty the prisons, with criminals serving ever-shorter sentences, at 15 per cent.

Amendment 55 comes right at the end of part 1, which deals with the modernisation of the court provisions. As we know, on 30 November 2025, the current temporary provisions that extend certain time limits in solemn cases will revert to the previous pre-pandemic time limits for new cases that enter the system. That is an issue that the committee has interrogated quite a lot during the bill process, and there was some recent movement on the issue on the part of the cabinet secretary, which I welcome and believe is commendable.

However, during the process, significant concerns were raised that the reversion was not without risk. As the committee’s stage 1 report notes, the Law Society told the committee that, due to issues around the capacity of the courts to accommodate trials,

“It is very difficult to see the courts getting back on track to the point where we will have trials within, for example, the 12-month time limit that applies in a bail case.”

The stage 1 report also notes that the Scottish Solicitors Bar Association said:

“The time limits are being extended on a daily basis. They are nowhere near pre-pandemic time limits. Time bars are being extended in just about every solemn case that I deal with.”—[Official Report, Criminal Justice Committee, 22 January 2025; c 29, 28.]

Finally, our report quotes the SCTS, which, when asked whether the system was on track for a return to pre-pandemic time limits, said:

“The short answer is no.”—[Official Report, Criminal Justice Committee, 29 January 2025; c 21.]

My amendment 55, therefore, simply seeks to address those concerns. It provides that ministers must prepare and publish a report within one year of the solemn courts reverting to pre-pandemic time limits, in order to determine whether courts have been able to meet the time limits and what further measures might be needed if they are not being met.

I move amendment 55.

I am worried that the cabinet secretary appears to be rejecting my amendment because of something that is happening in practice, whereas I am saying that best practice is what I am seeking to bring to the legislation. Is it not for practice to follow what the legislators have decided is the way forward?

I thank the cabinet secretary and colleagues for what they have said during the debate. I find myself persuaded by the cabinet secretary’s arguments for her amendments to section 4 and by her arguments on my amendments 44 and 45, particularly regarding the burden on courts of applications and the use of DESC. There is an interesting side question about technology-constraining legislation, but we will explore that at another time.

However, I will be moving amendment 46, because it is in line with the committee’s recommendations and, with respect, I did not hear strong arguments against it. I heard pretty persuasive arguments by Pauline McNeill for her amendments 47 and 93, which are largely similar to my amendment 46 but take it further.

I am not persuaded by the cabinet secretary’s argument on my amendment 49, because, to my mind, all that the amendment says is that evidence will not be destroyed until the appeal has been determined; it does not say that it should be kept for ever. If you will forgive me, that sounds like common sense. The Law Society of Scotland has told us that that is necessary and is a good idea. I remind the committee that I am a member of the Law Society. If it tells me that something is a good idea, I often listen to it. The cabinet secretary made a reasonable and important point that the provision might be financially burdensome, but it seems to me that someone’s liberty might be on the line here, and that is priceless. As I outlined in my opening comments, the Faculty of Advocates told us that physical items

“may provide decisive evidence to incriminate or exculpate an accused.”

That is why amendment 49 is so important.

I seek to withdraw amendment 44, but I look forward to the convener asking me the questions on my other amendments.

Amendment 44, by agreement, withdrawn.

Amendments 1 to 4 moved—[Angela Constance]—and agreed to.

Amendment 45 not moved.

Amendments 5 and 6 moved—[Angela Constance]—and agreed to.

Amendment 46 moved—[Liam Kerr].

My amendments 41 and 43 are both relevant to section 2, which deals with virtual attendance at court. When we look at what section 2 does, we need to ask whether, as drafted, it covers all necessary matters. On page 6 of the bill, proposed new section 303K of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 addresses the ability to attend by electronic means. That section states that someone who is excused from a requirement to physically attend court must do so by electronic means

“in accordance with a direction issued by the court.”

Proposed new section 303K(3) sets out what that direction should include. My amendment 41 simply asks that one part of that direction is

“to set out the location of where the person is to appear by electronic means”.

That reflects concerns that were raised in the committee’s report, which said:

“We recommend that the Bill is amended to include an additional requirement for the court to issue a direction in relation to the appropriateness of the location from which an individual participates, to address the concerns highlighted in evidence.”

It is, of course, entirely at the court’s discretion to determine what and where that location might be, and it would naturally take into account all the facts of the case.

On a practical level, I presume that that would be done only after consultation with the person concerned on the appropriateness of the locations that were available to them.

I move to amendment 43. Virtual attendance will be a pretty new concept to us, so the question is whether it will work. I think that it will, but there is a much remarked-on dearth of data and outputs in this Parliament generally. I seek to remedy that in amendment 43, at least at this level, because I am seeking to insert a new section—after section 2—to require a report on how the virtual attendance is working. The report would cover various elements such as reliability and resourcing, and I would like it to be published no later than two years after section 2 comes into force.

Again, that is in line with concerns that witnesses raised with the committee about virtual appearances being dependent on proper resourcing and current issues with technology. I remind the committee that the sheriffs principal told us:

“We would observe that virtual hearings are heavily dependent on the adequate resourcing of technology and infrastructure.”

The Faculty of Advocates told us:

“These undoubted and important benefits do come at a cost to the justice system. Valuable court time is regularly lost due to delays in establishing remote links and reestablishing failed remote links.”

That is also in line with a letter that I have received from the chief executive of the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service, which I can make available to anyone who requests it. I raised questions about the operation of virtual courts, and, in response, it was conceded that

“SCTS does receive feedback that live links are not always as effective as they could be.”

Therefore, my amendment 43 seeks to have a report on what is happening once the measure is brought in.

For completeness, I listened carefully to Pauline McNeill’s representations earlier on. If her amendment 34 goes through, I do not entirely understand how the costs and logistics might work. I will listen carefully to Pauline McNeill’s closing remarks, but, at this stage, I am not persuaded by amendment 34.

Similarly, I am not persuaded by Pauline McNeill’s amendment 37, as I worry about fettering the courts’ discretion and ability to manoeuvre. Again, I will listen carefully to her closing remarks.