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We have identified three particular areas in relation to powers to change the fundamental concepts of the bill, but this theme probably extends to some other areas that colleagues have already mentioned. In particular, sections 1(4), 2(4) and 4(2) essentially give the Government powers to alter quite fundamental concepts, such as who would be in scope to exercise the right to buy and the requirements around consultation, which could impact the timelines and even who could exercise those powers.

Will you explain why it is necessary to leave such fundamental concepts open in the primary legislation and to leave those powers to secondary legislation?

Given that, and given the wide flexibility—in your own words, it is flexible—is there not a risk that it almost lays open the possibility for the reverse to happen? Obviously, this is a democracy, and Administrations change. What if, hypothetically, the monopolist and large landowners party were to come to power in 10 years’ time? What would prevent it from using these provisions to bring about effects that were entirely contrary to the intent of the legislation as you have presented it?

Obviously, though, they cannot amend.

In your previous answers, you said that, in some areas, you are just bringing powers into line with other bits of legislation. Other than for reasons of consistency with older pieces of legislation, can you set out the rationale for bringing those powers into line and tell us whether there has been any impact assessment or analysis of whether they were appropriate to begin with? After all, the previous legislation could have got the balance wrong.

I have one final question. We are seeing a significant number of framework bills that have a broadly stated intention but in which the detail is largely left to secondary legislation. The rationale of co-design is often given.

It is absolutely right that the Government seeks to design legislation with as broad a range of stakeholders as possible—that makes sense. I have one simple question: why is it necessary to do that co-design following or in conjunction with legislation, rather than doing it beforehand and baking it into the legislation? In that way, the Parliament could consider the full suite and the finished article, rather than hope that the Government does the right kind of consultation and introduces the right kind of secondary legislation.

I will leave it there.

I am not asking you to explain each one. It is about the broad principle of leaving the scope and process so open in the primary legislation. Will you explain why that is necessary?

Potentially, this legislation would make things easier for a future Government, as it would not need primary legislation to do something that was almost the 180-degree opposite of the intent that you are setting out here.

Thank you for your welcome to the committee, convener. My entry in the register of interests shows that I am the director and sole shareholder of a limited company with retail interests.

In the light of the minister’s commitments and, indeed, his commentary on the key principles, I will not move amendment 20.

Amendment 20 not moved.

Section 1 agreed to.

After section 1

I will follow on from what Paul O’Kane and Colin Smyth have said. The key concern with the bill is not about the principle or its intent. The need to provide debt moratoriums for people who are in distress is well understood, and those arguments are well made. The issue is that this is a framework bill that does not provide much clarity on what impact a moratorium would have and on what the Government would be required to bring forward.

Section 1(2) includes various criteria regarding the regulations that the Government may bring forward, but there is no requirement for it to do so, nor does the list limit the range of things on which regulations may be made.

Indeed, under section 1(3), the Government will be able to make regulations that affect “any enactment”—any act of Parliament—and for any purpose. It is a very broad set of powers, and there is no clarity on precisely what will be introduced or what its impact will be. Given that we are talking about debt, which is a fundamental part of the way in which our economy works, and about its impact on individuals, it is important that any regulations that the Government introduces under the bill are properly scrutinised. That is the intent of my amendments 20 and 21.

Amendment 20 would create a duty to consult before regulations are introduced. I have stipulated the types of organisations and agencies that the Government should consult. I contend that one might want to go further than that and clarify the type of consultation that ought to take place.

Amendment 21 sets out a time period and would place a requirement on the Government to come back to a committee of the Parliament to consult with it regarding the issue. If the measures were being introduced through primary legislation, that is exactly what the Government would have to do. It would have to consult widely with the relevant agencies and seek feedback, and there would have to be a stage 1 report.

The Government will say that the bill has been framed in the way that it has been framed in order to provide flexibility, so that it can get the measures right. However, although that may suit the Government and enable it to do its work, it will not enable the sort of public scrutiny and the detailed inquiry that the committee has been undertaking with the primary legislation. The reality is that the detailed measures will not get that level of scrutiny. Ultimately, we need steps such as a stage 1 report, stage 2 amendments and stage 3 finalisation to ensure that we get the measures right. To go back to a previous point, when we are talking about matters of financial distress and debt, we are talking about matters that are of fundamental importance and an area where there can often be unintended consequences. Therefore, quite simply, that level of scrutiny is required.

Furthermore, I would like the Government to consider whether it should limit the powers that are being conferred under section 1. The fact that we have an unlimited list and such broadly framed regulation-making powers is not appropriate. At the very least, the powers should be referred to in the long title of the bill—that is not unreasonable. It is not reasonable for ministers to seek powers under any piece of legislation, not just this one, that will enable them to introduce regulations on any matter that they so desire.