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I just want to make a general point, convener. I was going to say, “Could you just say all of that again, cabinet secretary? I did not quite catch it”, but I will not.

What is self-evident—it is really just to put this on the record—is that the Government’s legislation team is moving through the bill with a fine-toothed comb to tighten and clarify matters. In years to come, whoever is sitting on the committee will welcome those clarifications. It has clearly involved a lot of work from the officials. Although that is, of course, their job, we really welcome the work that they have put in with regard to section 17.

It was lovely to hear that Jeremy Balfour is regretful of his previous views on SCOSS. I did not hear him repent, but nonetheless.

I ask the cabinet secretary to say in summing up whether there will be a need at some point in the future for a more consolidated strategic review of the powers and effectiveness of SCOSS, and whether it might not be the place of the bill to tack something on to increase the powers of the commission. Rather, we as a Parliament could decide at some point in the future—this committee could hold evidence sessions on it—what the appropriate powers and roles of SCOSS would look like. The Government could respond to that or it could do something more proactive. I am just not sure that this bill is the right piece of legislation to do that bit of work

I will come on to that later in my contribution, but I refute the way in which Mr Balfour has framed his question to me. I will say more about that a little later, too.

If we were to take Mr Balfour’s advice, Social Security Scotland would have the best audit in the world. I accept that the level of fraud is very low at the moment, but I think that it would be almost completely non-existent, and errors would be almost non-existent, too, if we had a self-selecting audit. Those likely to step forward to be audited in the first place would be those who were absolutely not likely to have had an overpayment or to have engaged in fraudulent activity. It would be the best audit in the world and would show that Social Security Scotland was doing a fantastic job. I am sure that it is doing a very good job, but we have to identify any weaknesses that there might be, and a self-selecting audit would not allow us to do so.

No pressure on me to be concise then, convener. I appreciate your proactive chastisement of my remarks.

I believe that Jeremy Balfour has made incredibly well-intentioned and important arguments, but I genuinely and sincerely think that his solutions are weak. I would make a similar point about Maggie Chapman’s amendment 58, too, and I will reflect on that in my contribution.

Having an audit process that was entirely voluntary, as Mr Balfour appears to suggest, would mean that it would not be systematic and methodical, and that would be a key weakness in trying to meet the recommendations that Audit Scotland made a few years ago. It would put the legislation at a disadvantage if we were to agree to Mr Balfour’s amendment, so I suggest that we do not do so.

I am happy to take more interventions from Mr Balfour, but I suggest that, if he waits a wee bitty, he will see that I am going to come on to all of that. I just want to say that, if we agreed to his amendment today, any such audit would lack credibility.

It is weak to argue that we already have a backstop through the power that relates to an unscheduled review of circumstances. If Audit Scotland were to use that power for audit purposes, one would feel that it was targeting individuals; after all, the power exists to deal with cases where Social Security Scotland thinks that there might have been a change of circumstances, fraudulent activity or an overpayment. Therefore, the use of that power indicates—almost—that something is amiss, whereas with a random, statistically significant, structured, strategic and methodical audit, no one would be targeted. Using the backstop power that Mr Balfour has suggested would, in my view, mean targeting individuals.

I would like the cabinet secretary to provide a bit more information ahead of stage 3, or perhaps at stage 3, on the exemptions that will be consulted on. I would also like to get a bit more clarity on the threshold at which payments will be suspended. Mr Balfour made a strong point about the fact that one of the reasons that someone might not supply the required information is that they are clearly vulnerable. I want to know about the threshold at which Social Security Scotland will move to suspend a benefit. For example, will the person concerned get a knock on their door from someone who has come to do a welfare check? I want to know what risk assessment will be done and how a person’s risk profile will be assessed before any move to suspend assistance is made. It is important that we get more information on that, but that does not mean that I concede that, as well intentioned as Mr Balfour’s and Ms Chapman’s amendments are, they should be agreed to.

Finally, perhaps the cabinet secretary could say a bit more about how, once the audit process is embedded in Social Security Scotland, the agency will review the process to improve or finesse it. I believe that the suspension of payments should be an absolute last resort. Therefore, we need to get the threshold right and to put welfare before the suspension of benefits. There is a balance to be struck there, which Mr Balfour and Ms Chapman are trying to explore today, but I do not think that their amendments would secure that.

Will Jeremy Balfour give way?

Mr Balfour, the policy intent of amendment 14 seems to be to have a presumption in favour of face-to-face hearings rather than a presumption in favour of choice, but your argument seems to be that you want the policy intent to be to have a presumption in favour of choice rather than a presumption in favour of face-to-face hearings. I am concerned that your policy intent does not match your amendment.

I appreciate the balanced approach that Mr O’Kane is taking in considering the amendments. Whatever the committee and Parliament ultimately decide, does he agree that if someone does not supply information, that does not necessarily mean that there has been an overpayment or any fraud? It could mean that there is vulnerability, which is why they have not got back to Social Security Scotland. If we proceed with the suspension of payments, which I think we should do, we have to be very clear about the threshold in relation to welfare checks around when suspension might ultimately kick in.

I am supportive of the position that you outline, cabinet secretary, but I am also conscious that Mr Balfour suggested a scenario in which the individual wanted the representative to stay in place but, for whatever reason, the paperwork, the bureaucracy and the administration around refreshing that authorisation went astray. There could be a variety of reasons for that, and I think that Mr Balfour—I am not speaking for him; I am just trying to get clarity from you, cabinet secretary—was worried that that could be an unintended consequence of withdrawing that representative mandate. What safeguards would be in place under the Government position? Is it more about the culture and practice within the system than having specific provisions in the bill?

I will seek to be brief, convener. I want to follow up Gordon MacDonald’s line of questioning to Al Denholm on how the removal of financial transactions and capital revenues might have changed the Scottish National Investment Bank’s investment decisions. Mr Denholm, you talked about the target rate of return and the reinvestment rate, but a thread running through this whole thing is the need to support Scotland’s moving to net zero by 2045. Might the investment decisions that are being made lead the bank to make certain decisions that prioritise investment return and sustainability instead of maximising the pursuit of net zero by 2045?

I have a horse in this race—well, we all have a horse in this race, but I am a member of the Scottish Parliament’s Net Zero, Energy and Transport Committee, which is looking at five-year carbon budgets and the next plan in relation to all of this, and we know that we need to leverage in more major private investment than public investment if we are to get to net zero. Are investment decisions being changed and altered in a way that might compromise that private investment, because of the removal of UK financial transactions revenues?