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Okay.

Get Glasgow Moving has a live petition, which is not with the committee as yet, although I suspect that it might end up with us. I thank it for its briefing and dialogue ahead of today’s meeting. It asks for two things that appear to be contradictory: it wants to fully enact the franchising provisions of the 2019 act, which the instrument seeks to do today, but it also wants a speedier, more streamlined and easier system to secure franchising.

I am not speaking for Get Glasgow Moving—it will be watching the meeting carefully and will speak for itself—but, similar to what Michael Matheson said, if we complete the powers of the 2019 act, will the Scottish Government continue to monitor what is happening elsewhere, learn lessons from that and, if required, reflect and change course? In other words, it will not be a myopic Scottish Government that passes the instrument and says, “Job done”, but will continue to review what is happening elsewhere.

So, leaving aside various points on which the SPT and others would want a statutory instrument or guidance to reflect what they think is the best design and structure of the arrangements, can you confirm that you are not aware of any overarching or underlying issue for SPT? Can you also confirm that it will, as a matter of course, be consulted on the drafting of guidance?

I have one final question. I highlight that the third bullet point of the petition from Get Glasgow Moving relates to cash—the finance and money to make all this work. Points 1 and 2 are moot if there is no cash in the system to do these things.

If a future Government were to decide to unpick the provisions of the 2019 act, that would—as we have heard—involve another full review of the franchising system, which could take quite some time.

Mr Lumsden will, during the debate, tell us his motivations for wanting to annul the instrument. It is for him to speak for himself in that regard; however, some politicians simply do not agree with franchising and will use any tool in the toolbox to wreck the proposals.

Would you be concerned that, without anything to replace the pathway to franchising, there is a risk that what replaces it in a future session of Parliament might not be as robust as what we currently have?

Will the member take an intervention?

Will the guidance that will be implemented learn the lessons of the Nexus experience in 2015? There will be cognisance of the fact that the UK Government changed its position through the Bus Services Act 2017, but I also note that the act that we are fully implementing today was passed in 2019. I suspect that everything that we have heard about today, when we have spoken about the need to learn the lessons from what happened elsewhere, was already known when that primary legislation was passed in 2019.

I note that the Welsh experience is still fluid with regard to a national franchising system, and that that system is completely different from what would happen in Scotland. Therefore, will the guidance take into account the experiences in England and Wales in order to ensure that the situation is balanced, proportionate and fair to SPT and others, so that there is a reasonable expectation that a strong and robust case will be approved by an independent panel?

All roads lead back to the guidance, convener.

If the pathway to franchising does not include passing this statutory instrument, will there be no guidance for a panel to look at? Will it, if you like, create its own guidance and decide its priorities for itself? In other words, decisions would still be made by a panel, but it would be less likely to base those decisions on guidance, which would be in the public interest. Is that your understanding?

I am mindful that SPT has been mentioned a few times, convener. Although I am sure that it will be well aware that the statutory instrument exists, it has not proactively contacted the committee about it. Has SPT proactively contacted the Government about it, minister? Will it be a key partner in consultation on guidance that might flow from the statutory instrument?

Hindsight is a wonderful thing. My issue with the 2019 act is that using a negative instrument is not the best way to make these regulations, which have “affirmative instrument” written all over them. We should give this a bit more time.

Having said that, I agree that we should take the path towards franchising, as was envisaged on a cross-party basis in 2019. The analysis of the possible issues with having an independent panel draws on the 2015 experience and the 2017 legislative changes, but we passed the act in 2019. Those experiences would have been considered at that time by Parliament and by the committee, which I was not on in 2019.

The one difference that I have with Mr Ruskell is that I think that guidance is key. We are close in many ways, because we want to see a franchising model that will benefit travellers, commuters and communities by taking a partnership approach. Guidance is key and will make a huge difference, so I would like to hear a little more from the minister about how that guidance will be pulled together.

Thank you, minister. I appreciate that there have been lots of interventions during your contribution.

If the panel is still to be set up, because that is in primary legislation, and no one can assume what primary legislation will or will not pass in this parliamentary session or after the 2026 election, would the current Scottish Government still seek to produce—or is it possible to have—non-statutory guidance that the Government would ask the traffic commissioner and the independent panel to take cognisance of, although they would have no need to do that whatsoever? My view would be that, if you can do that, I would rather have that guidance on a statutory footing rather than having a pick-and-mix, take-it-or-leave-it approach from the independent panel.

I fully appreciate what Mr Harvie is trying to achieve with amendment 27, but there are a lot of moving parts in the finances that are required to meet climate targets, as Monica Lennon outlined. There is UK Government direct funding; there are Barnett consequentials from the UK Government; there are the unexpected in-year revisions that can happen to the Scottish budget as a result of UK Government changes; there are the Scottish Government’s policy decisions; there are local authorities; there is the private sector; and there are consumers and the public, who might have to pay more, directly or indirectly. There is an idea that we can land on a precise total or quantum that would be the Scottish Government’s contribution, but that might be a moveable feast. Would you reflect on that, Mr Harvie? How can we reconcile that with the amendments that have been proposed?