���˿���

The point that I have been trying to make is that Parliament itself now has to take a role in that. By that, I mean the politicians in Parliament who discuss these things in a transparent and open way and not the corporate body, whose job it is simply to execute the will of the Parliament. As a Parliament, we need to consider what the architecture of those positions should be.

The leadership for the actual political execution within public services comes from Government. It should be holding the public services to account and politicians should be holding the Government to account to ensure that those public services are held to account. To my mind, that is the democratic route for taking forward these things. I have always been concerned that, with this raft of commissioners, we are creating a new level of Government that did not exist when the Parliament was established. It is not elected, and it is not properly accountable, but there is a danger that the elected representatives who are challenging the Government are saying that it is not their job but the commissioners’ job to take these things forward, and we are all then left wondering what we do in that regard. Parliament has to understand the beast that it is creating, because it is Parliament that is creating it.

David McGill was hoping to come in.

I do not know that the corporate body would have a view about that in particular.

You are asking me to draw on nearly 50 years of involvement in politics.

Again—I am looking at Maggie Chapman here—that is not something that the corporate body has discussed, but I have to say that the idea that you articulate is a very interesting one. It would create the advocacy opportunity that you have identified, but perhaps with a beginning, a middle and an end in terms of clear accountability through the committee structure. You have presented a very interesting alternative way of considering how the advocacy functions might be taken forward.

In the previous session of Parliament, we did everything that we could to rationalise costs by bringing together as many of the commissioners as possible. From memory, we saved about £0.5 million through that work.

I know that additional space has become available and that there is the possibility of consolidating. That would work, because it would allow the commissioners to share some back-office functions, which would certainly save money. One or two other commissioners are located in places with quite long leases attached to them, so it will be longer before those can be looked at again.

We are pretty rigorous. The corporate body does not roll over and say, “You asked for another £1 million, how about £2 million?” We are more inclined to say, “Hang on a minute: you asked for another £1 million but can you explain why?”, and we have declined some requests.

It is also the case that some commissioners have had additional responsibilities placed on them that come with a consequent requirement for additional staff so that those can be fulfilled. I come back to the fact that it is the corporate body’s responsibility to ensure that office-holders who have been established by the will of Parliament are adequately resourced to undertake their functions. It would be difficult to apply a fixed budget, given that, even as we speak, additional responsibilities are being attached to the commissioners that we currently have and that those responsibilities will bring additional burdens with which they will have to cope.

I would hope not. There is a characteristic history of legacy reports from one parliamentary session to the next, with those legacy reports forming the basis of understanding as to how Parliament will proceed. I do not think that there is any political ill will on that point, but nobody has actually thought about it. The control that there was previously, with the Government being very reluctant to facilitate the establishment of such bodies, has changed. Therefore, if there was an agreed architecture, most ���˿��� in a future Parliament would be quite happy to operate within whatever that architecture was. That is my own view.

The first thing to say is that there is my personal view and there is the view of the corporate body. The corporate body does not have an executive function in this regard. We are there to implement the will of Parliament as expressed. I noticed a suggestion from the Deputy First Minister that the corporate body could have a series of tests by which the establishment of a commissioner would be judged. That is not our responsibility. We in the corporate body do not have a party-political function. It is the will of Parliament to express whether it wants a commissioner and our responsibility is to facilitate that commissioner.

Professor Alan Page made a point about the complete volte face of the Government that is directly relevant to what you say. In 2008, I served on the committee that was established at the Government’s instigation to rationalise the number of commissioners that we had. That was difficult because, once the recommendations that we made to rationalise commissioners—with all the support of colleagues as we did it—became public, the people who saw that their commissioner might be rationalised away started campaigns with ���˿���, who then got cold feet about the idea of rationalising commissioners. The problem is that, once the commissioners are there, they are difficult to walk back from.

The Scottish Government now seems keen on the establishment of commissioners as an instrument of policy. Whatever has changed, the Parliament has never had an architecture by which it and ���˿��� independently judge whether the establishment of a commissioner is a good thing. It is simply a proposal—for example, in a member’s bill—that goes through the relevant committee without more general and rounded consideration of whether it adds to or hinders the overall architecture. If the Government is going to be keener on that, rather than unenthusiastic, Parliament has to consider whether it should set up the architecture by which such proposals are judged, before it even gets to the discussion in committee of what the individual’s particular powers might or might not be.

In that sense, we have to be a bit keener on saying no to some things. David McGill always tells me that I am in danger of exaggerating these things but, wearing my finance hat, I think that it is about 12 per cent of our budget now.

That would not necessarily follow. There is some sympathy for the suggestion that you raise from within the current architecture of commissioners, who are concerned that clear lines of responsibility and authority are potentially being diluted by having additional advocacy commissioners. Where does the human rights commissioner sit within that structure? Could the approach that you suggest have been a better way forward?

I go back to my earlier point about architecture and how these things are established. That comes about because an organisation engages the support of an MSP, who makes a proposal for a bill to create a commissioner, but any suggestion that that commissioner might fit within an existing structure is not really something that you can create a bill for—it does not fit our current structural arrangements.

Parliament has to get that right first, and then judge how to go forward. We may well go from royal commission, to summit, conference, tsar and commissioner and end up with all of us wanting a rapporteur for our particular cause. I do not know what will happen, but it would be reassuring if the architecture around that were more robust.

The petition has achieved nominal success, but we want that to be followed by substantive success.

Do members agree to keep the petition open and to make the inquiries that Mr Choudhury suggested?

Members indicated agreement.