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The issue is not only how long we live, but how long we live in good health. That is a major issue, certainly in the area that I represent, where the average age at which people go out of good health is as low as 56—in other words, people can live in ill health for 15 to 20 years. That is a major issue for the individuals concerned, never mind for budgetary considerations.

I am keen to look at what you say about the annual budget gaps. You say:

“We also assume the UK Government does not take action to address its own fiscal sustainability challenges.”

Why would it not do that?

I do not know whether “optimistic” is the right word to use if you are talking about the UK population being projected to grow to around 82 million people—that is around 15 million more than it is already. Large chunks of England are already pretty much concreted over, so I am not convinced that people will necessarily welcome that. You are suggesting that, on average, a net 20,000 migrants a year will come to Scotland, in addition to 10,000 from other parts of the UK. Given that most political parties—certainly at Westminster—are trying to reduce migration levels, how confident are you that those figures will be maintained?

Thank you for that very helpful opening statement. The comments next to the very first graph on page 3 of the report sum the situation up: although health spending stands at 36 per cent of the Scottish budget now, it could grow to around 40 per cent by 2029-30 and to an astonishing 55 per cent in 2074-75. There has to be real concern about that, and we have to look at how we can possibly change it.

I do not want to steal John Mason’s thunder, as he always comments on our ability to project things 50 years into the future when there are so many changes, but, in the last two years, the Scottish Fiscal Commission has changed its projections of the Scottish population by 15 per cent, which is pretty drastic. You now predict that there will be 800,000 more people in Scotland than you had predicted a couple of years ago. One is understandably concerned about how projections within such a short period can be so hugely different.

Thank you, John. Incidentally, I want to ask a question before I go to colleagues: when did pie charts become fan charts? They were always pie charts when I was at school. [Laughter.]

Indeed. You mention towards the end of your report “the Finnish practice”, the “Committee of the Future” and the “Report of the Future” that it must produce.

You also say:

“If Social Security spending rises more quickly in Scotland then equivalent spending elsewhere ... then in the absence of significant borrowing powers, plans made by other departments will instead be disrupted.”

Do you think that there is an inability to deal effectively with annual pay rises? Is that also a major issue facing the Government? We have seen almost unrealistic pay suggestions—I will call them suggestions rather than anything else—of 3 per cent a year for three years being put into the budget. Is there any possibility or likelihood that such suggestions will be held to, or is there a strong possibility that the Government will once again have to bring out an emergency statement in the autumn because it will again be giving higher settlements than were set out in the budget that was passed in February?

Your point about loss aversion has been well made over the past two or three years, and I completely agree with your view on that.

Mairi, what is your view? Do you think that committees feel that they put in a lot of effort and do a lot of work for no real reward? Does the Scottish Government actually listen to committees? You write about this committee in your report, in which you say:

“The FPAC scrutiny of tax policy has succeeded in moving the conversation to net tax yields of income tax measures rather than static, which has been a really positive step and moves the discussion away from the unhelpful and unrealistic large numbers from static costings.”

You point out that this committee has had some influence on the budget, although not as much as we would like.

Are there any areas where subject committees have made a significant difference to how the budget is ultimately arrived at, or is it just about the Government getting politicians into a corner and putting them in a room to hammer things out until there is a majority for the budget?

Thank you for that. The first colleague to ask questions will be Liz Smith, followed by John Mason.

You have said:

“The OBR does not have any role in forecasting or scrutinising public spending decisions taken by the Scottish Government as part of the Scottish Budget process. However, it is an important part of the role we play in the UK Budget process and is area where we have significantly enhanced our approach over the past year.”

What impact, if any, has that had on UK budgetary decisions relating to Scotland?

You have talked about undertaking

“deeper analytical assessments of drivers of our devolved tax forecasts”.

Will you touch on a couple of those?

Okay. Thanks. Since 2022, you have introduced forecast evaluation analysis for your Scottish forecasts. How has that improved accuracy on your forecasts?