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Another area that you touched on in your opening statement was duplication. You say in your report that

“One interviewee highlighted that the focus on creating more bodies to promote and support human rights did not support the findings of the Crerar Review in 2007, which reviewed regulation, audit, inspection and complaints handling of public services in Scotland. It found that scrutiny arrangement in Scotland were complex, and aimed to simplify and reduce bodies.”

The Deputy First Minister contacted us about that particular issue with regard to the strategic approach to the commissioner landscape and said:

“As agreed by Cabinet on 9 May 2023, the Scottish Government’s Ministerial Control Framework (MCF) aims to ensure that decisions around the creation of new public bodies are made based on evidence and value for money”.

The first of the three principles that she touches on is that new public bodies

“should only be set up as a last resort”.

That is completely different, incidentally, from what The Times reported today. It talks about the Scottish Government wanting to double the number of commissioners. I was certainly not aware that it was trying to do that. In the context of your research, how do you view the issue of the number of bodies and how duplication can be avoided?

One of the things that I found interesting with regard to the submissions that we received—distinct from the report—is that a lot of the existing commissioners are not too enthusiastic about additional commissioners. For example, the Children and Young People’s Commissioner Scotland said:

“the proliferation of Commissioners offices will be a costly exercise and may not provide good value for money for taxpayers, especially if there are multiple bodies tasked with intervening on similar or identical matters.”

Did you find in your research that there was something of a resistance from the commissioners and those bodies to extending remits to more commissioners?

Okay, I will try not to stray too far from your research then—although it is tempting. I will ask you just a couple more questions.

A commissioner is restricted to three to five years in post and then another commissioner replaces them. However, I did not see anything in your research—let me know if I have missed it—about sunset clauses. When a commissioner sets up, and once they are in existence, I would expect there to be lots of energy and enthusiasm—they might think, “Oh, there’s things that we’ve wanted to do for the last 10 years, now we’ve got a commissioner, we can press ahead and do it” and so on. However, one would think that a lot of what they would hope to deliver might start to tail off. Might there be an argument therefore for a sunset clause so that, for example, when a commissioner steps down and retires, the question whether that body should continue if it has completed its tasks, or, indeed, whether a new commissioner should be appointed, should be looked at?

I did not think that you would be able to, but I thought that it was worth a punt. Let us open up the questions to colleagues.

I understand that there is an element of frustration from committee members. We have seen the research, and I understand that you have undertaken only the research that you were commissioned to do. You have been asking people whether they support a new commissioner or whether they think that resources could be better allocated. Do you agree that, if we do not know the potential outcomes in relation to improvements—or not, as the case may be—from having a new commissioner, the exercise is two dimensional?

I am asking for your opinion, based on your research and on the discussions. You have to understand the frustration of the committee—we are looking for some kind of answer, lead or steer. You have undertaken this comprehensive research. It is not as comprehensive as we would like, but it is a not insubstantial document, and you have covered a lot of ground. Having spoken to the people you have spoken to, do you feel that there should be a more robust mechanism for developing commissioners? You referred to that when you said that there is

“no handbook or blueprint within government for designing the role”.

The implication is that you surely feel that there should be one.

Do you want to make any further points before we wind up?

Good morning, and welcome to the 13th meeting in 2024 of the Finance and Public Administration Committee. We have received apologies from Ross Greer.

The first item on our agenda is to take evidence as part of our inquiry into Scotland’s commissioner landscape. We are joined online by Katy MacMillan, the director of Research Scotland. I welcome her to the meeting and invite her to make an opening statement.

Thank you very much for that helpful introduction.

I notice that you interviewed five of the commissioners in Scotland. Why did you decide not to interview all seven in Scotland to ensure that all views were heard?

Page 55 of your report, which you have touched on there, is really important because it looks at how commissioners are not the only game in town. One could argue that organisations are looking for specific improved outcomes, and perhaps people see commissioners as a way of getting there more easily than constantly having to battle for additional resources. Is that correct?