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I want to follow up on the exchange between Mr Scott and Fulton MacGregor. I think that Mr Scott was making the point that, with regard to those who should carry the obligation to be trauma informed, the bill needs to have a wider scope. I put to Mr Scott the question that I put to the previous panel, as to whether the list of persons to which those obligations should apply needs to be expanded. Again, for the record, the 2014 act lists:

“the Lord Advocate ... the Scottish Ministers ... the chief constable ... the Scottish Court Service”

and

“the Parole Board”.

If he believes that that list should be expanded, does he have anyone else in mind?

I have one further question. In the 2014 act, the obligation to pursue the principles that I talked about is applied to

“(a) the Lord Advocate,

(b) the Scottish Ministers,

(c) the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland,

(d) the Scottish Court Service”

and

“(e) the Parole Board for Scotland”.

Does that cover sufficient organisations?

I am interested in the linkage between the bill’s provisions on trauma-informed practice and the provisions in parts 5 and 6. Forgive me for being specific here, convener, but I note that section 43(4) says:

“In carrying out the responsibility imposed by subsection (1), the President must have regard to the desirability of doing so in a way that accords with trauma-informed practice.”

I am keen to understand how satisfied the Government is that the bill’s provisions will result in a genuinely more trauma-informed experience for victims. Sharon Dowey asked whether we could not achieve that simply by adapting our existing court system, but I tend to come to the view that the existing court system is so cumbersome and so heavily laden with procedure that it is difficult to adapt. I am interested to find out about the thinking that has been done to ensure that we can be satisfied that the sexual offences court would operate in a more trauma-informed way than could be achieved by adapting the existing court arrangements in Scotland.

I asked the question because the degree of risk increases depending on whether we are talking about three out of 15 or three out of 12; the risk becomes greater. Have you considered the extent to which the turnover of jurors might be a factor in influencing people’s confidence that trials will proceed?

What consideration has been given to placing in statute—in the bill—a greater obligation on organisations to take account of the perspective of victims rather than establishing a victims commissioner? The provisions on the victims commissioner say, for completely understandable reasons, that the victims commissioner cannot look at individual cases but only at general conclusions arising out of particular cases or groups of cases. Would an alternative approach not be to put greater legal obligation on the various agencies that are involved to act in a manner that reflects the perspective and interests of victims?

I appreciate that answer. I will follow up by asking about an issue that, I suspect, contributes significantly to trauma—that of timescales and the amount of time that a victim has to wait for the process to reach some form of conclusion. I completely accept the cabinet secretary’s explanation of the fact that ensuring that trauma-informed practice is applied in all circumstances is the thinking that underpins the Government’s approach. Does the Government believe that the bill as drafted imposes a sufficient obligation on courts to improve timescales for the handling of such cases as part of the process of ensuring that trauma-informed practice is applied in all circumstances?

On that point, there is a lot of hope and aspiration in the comments that Ms McCloy has just put on the record. I am interested to ensure that that is turned into practical reality, and that we do not simply create a sexual offences court that looks awfy similar to existing courts. I am interested in how we are able to oblige that to happen.

I come to my last question. An element of the court process that we have not talked about so far is the conduct of the defence. I unreservedly accept the points in the policy memorandum about the importance of balance and the protection of the right to justice in the process. However, I cannot be the only person who has been horrified by the conduct of some defence solicitors in the way in which these matters are pursued in court.

The Government can introduce a bill that does all that it possibly can to apply trauma-informed practice to the conduct of cases considering alleged sexual crime, but what obligations will the defence be under? What approaches can be taken to ensure that the behaviour in the courts of our land that horrifies many of us is not replicated in the sexual offences court?

I remind the committee and people observing that I sat in Cabinet when the bill was constructed. That is consistent with what I said to the committee in my declaration of interests a couple of weeks ago. However, I will not return to that every week that we discuss the bill.

There will be cases in which jurors are judged not to be appropriate to sit on particular trials, or become ill and have to stand down. In reducing the jury size, has consideration been given to the potential unintended consequence of the criminal justice system more regularly getting to a point at which a trial cannot proceed because jury numbers have become too low?

Despite the bill’s good intentions to strengthen the position of victims and reduce trauma, victims might inadvertently be put at risk of increased trauma, because reducing the number of jurors from 15 to 12 might increase the risk that the absence or loss of jurors will impact on the jury system’s effectiveness.

Does the improvement of those two processes provide you with sufficient confidence that, in theory, they would substantively address some of the early issues that families may have in the absence of a fatal accident inquiry being able to be undertaken in a timeous fashion?