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It is a powerful set of recommendations. We all get repeat customers in relation to casework inquiries. It can often be a core set of people who are always coming back to us about issues because they have tapped into the mechanism of how to do it. That does not mean that the mechanism of how to do it is widely known about; it can be quite an arcane procedure and it can also be quite intimidating to get in touch with an MSP or an MP. I think that it would be useful to make that process more accessible.

From time to time, we get mass email campaigns, whereby a campaign organisation will create an information box that allows people to punch in an address and then send a model response on a campaign issue. We can get thousands of duplicate emails, to which we have to do a mass response. That can be fine from the point of view of perfunctory engagement, and it is broadly used to signal mass interest in a particular issue, but it is not a form of close engagement.

I suggest that the Parliament might be able to create a better interface that people could use to write to their MSP. It might be a matter of scanning a QR code on, for example, a bus shelter advertisement, which could bring up a pro forma document that provides their constituency and regional ���˿���, asks about the nature of their issue and gives the text to fill out the box. That would make it easier to send an email; it might be less intimidating than having to sit and manually type it all out. That might make the process somewhat simpler.

There could also be a call-back service—if someone requested a call back on an issue, they could get a phone call—or a surgery booking service. Perhaps it would be better for the Parliament to have an interface on its website for doing such things, rather than people having to rely on individual ���˿���’ social media and websites for information, because the quality of that information can be highly variable. That is just a thought.

There is also the TheyWorkForYou website, which makes engagement a bit easier, but that might not be the easiest of interfaces.

Thank you very much, Dr Tucker. That is really helpful with regard to understanding the broader political concerns. Do you have any further comments in relation to the broad scope of that clause, Sir Jonathan?

To verify your position, would you regard the use of secondary legislation for the purpose of the revocation and replacement of REUL as completely inappropriate? Based on the need for scrutiny, should the emphasis, or at least the general presumption, be on using primary legislation rather than on using secondary legislation?

I thank the witnesses for their helpful contributions.

The powers in clause 15 allow UK ministers and devolved ministers to revoke retained EU law until the end of 2023, or assimilated law from 1 January 2024, and replace it. That power will be available to ministers until 23 June 2026. Where provision is made to replace retained or assimilated law, the replacement provision can implement different policy objectives. I am keen to get your collective views on the scope of the power to revoke and replace retained EU law and assimilated law.

Thanks for that. There is—

That is fair enough. Thank you.

I will come back in on the point around clause 8 and legislative hierarchy. Clause 8 relates to the removal of the principle of supremacy of EU law. Clause 4 reverses the principle that retained EU law takes precedence over incompatible domestic law. The power in clause 8 will enable ministers to specify that the reversal of the principle does not apply to specific pieces of domestic law and retained EU law and, therefore, that retained EU law continues to take precedence. That will allow ministers to retain the existing hierarchy where that is desirable in order to avoid unintended consequences or to ensure continuity.

The power in clause 8 is exercisable by Scottish and UK ministers in areas of devolved competence. UK ministers are therefore given the power to set the interpretative hierarchy that applies to legislation in devolved areas—bearing in mind that the devolution settlement was never designed with the presumption that we would end up being outside the EU, which has caused disruption.

Do you have any comments to offer on that? I will start with Dr Tucker.

That is helpful—thank you, Dr Tucker. Sir Jonathan, do you have anything further to add?

That is certainly helpful. It begs more questions than answers, but I guess that that is just a sign of the constitutional immaturity of the way in which the UK Government is proceeding.

To hear it put as starkly as that—that Parliament will have no capacity to scrutinise that—was powerful.

There is also the point that ministers will not be able to use the revocation replacement powers to increase regulatory burdens. The Hansard Society has stated that that

“is tantamount, with just a few caveats, to a ‘do anything we want’ power for Ministers”,

and that clause 15(5)

“imposes what amounts to a regulatory ceiling. This is contrary to previous claims from UK Ministers that in some areas REUL might be amended to enhance regulatory requirements (e.g., in the field of animal welfare).”

In your view, Sir Jonathan, will that preclude ministers from improving the standards, rights and protections that are currently enshrined in retained EU law?