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I thank Ed Poole and Guto Ifan for their submission. I echo the sentiments of everyone else on the committee: it really is excellent.

How have the different BGAs per income tax band been beneficial for Wales, given what you have outlined about the difference in your tax base? What are the primary benefits of that system going forward in the light of post-Brexit immigration restrictions?

That is quite a general question. It is fine for whoever wants to answer to do it.

Thank you.

I can see that David Phillips wants to come in. He has put an R in the chat box.

I have a question for all three of the Davids, but perhaps Professor David Bell could start. We have focused on Scotland and Wales, but I am interested in what helpful precedents operate elsewhere in the world, particularly those that deal with issues around fiscal transfers and divergence over time. I feel as though we are dancing on the head of a pin, particularly in relation to indexation methods, and some of those problems are not unique. I would appreciate some thoughts from Professor Bell on that in relation to the review.

[Inaudible.]—and everybody for the barking that came out of nowhere.

Thank you for that, Ed. Do you have anything to add, Guto? That is my only question.

Good morning. I am finding this evidence session very enjoyable so far, and I thank the cabinet secretary for highlighting the complexity of the process of money being allocated, drawn down and spent, and how that expands from one financial year to the next. Of course, that is all about financial asymmetry, but I also want to explore our own asymmetry.

I had the chance to glance through the report by the three Davids entitled “Options for reforming the devolved fiscal frameworks post-pandemic”, which recommends:

“Given that devolved governments cannot really exercise full control over health policy in the absence of appropriate economic support measures, a feasibility study into making furlough-type support available on a geographical basis should be urgently undertaken and published.”

You also correctly alluded to the fact that things have moved rapidly since some of the recent data came out. Do you have any indication yet of UK Treasury thinking about what type of financial support, such as furlough, could be available if and when the anticipated peak of the current Covid crisis hits us in mid-January?

I appreciate that it is extremely complex; I absolutely understand that. Thank you for the figures. It is useful to have them on the record.

Given the uncertainty about that and what looks to be an increased provision, do you see a point coming at which you would seek to charge back to the UK Government the costs incurred by the Scottish Parliament because we are, in accounting terms, in uncharted territory in which the new environment may come to be seen as special and beyond our normal operating environment? Have you considered the possibility of charging back or having that discussion? If not, would you consider that?

I have probably asked a question that nobody has thought about, but it may well come to that point if the head count and the additional cost are deemed to be significant.

I want to ask Jackson Carlaw a wee question. You mentioned tax in the light of the additional security requirements for members. What assurances can you give that the tax treatment vis-à-vis benefit in kind will be completely aligned between members of the Scottish Parliament and members at Westminster? You might not have been alluding to that. I apologise if you were not, but I wanted to ask that question.

You are carrying considerable risks. As a new member, I am not sure whether that is commonly understood.

I would like to move on to the medium-term financial strategy, in which you highlight a number of risks. One of those is the risk of

“Fundamental changes to the operation of finance in devolved policy making as a result of the UK Internal Market Act”.

Earlier, we heard from the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body, which has made provision for the scrutiny of changes triggered by that by creating an additional 21 jobs. That has a real cost implication, which the SPCB has done projections on.

Have you quantified that risk, beyond what is in your report? You have highlighted the risk, but what is the probability of its occurrence and what would be the implications if it occurs? It strikes me that the financial implications—from the point of view of real spend and of risk—are not yet sufficiently understood. Can you add some further colour to that?

Good morning, everybody. Thank you for the fulsome information—[Inaudible.].

I want to go back a bit and get a better understanding of the breakdown of the additional resource implications, which the convener probed earlier. You have described how the additional Brexit resource cost has gone down as we have moved out of the transition. However, I want to better understand your forecasting for the additional costs in terms of the full-time equivalent head count and the costs that have been triggered by the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020. In particular, I would like to hear about some of the funds that are being spent directly in Scotland by the UK Government. Perhaps you allude to that in your submission when you talk about

“where the UK Government makes decisions which have a direct impact on devolved areas.”

What specific additional head count, whether triggered by the internal market act or any additional funds, such as the levelling-up fund, have you forecast in your budget for this year? I am not sure whether that is a question for Jackson or David.